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Abstract
This paper presents and estimates a uniﬁed model where both human capital investment and job search are endogenized. This uniﬁcation enables us
to quantify the relative contributions of each mechanism to life cycle earnings
growth, while investigating potential interactions between human capital investment and job search. Within the uniﬁed framework, the expectation of
rising rental rates of human capital through job search gives workers more incentive to invest in human capital. In addition, unemployed workers reduce
their reservation rental rates and increase their search eﬀort to leave unemployment quickly to take advantage of human capital accumulation on the job.
The results show both forces are important for earnings growth and the interactions are substantial: human capital accumulation accounts for 31% of total
earnings growth, job search accounts for 46%, and the remaining 23% is due to
the interactions of the two.
Keywords: Human Capital, Job Search, Life Cycle, Earnings Growth.
JEL codes: J24, J64, D91.
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1

Introduction

A well established fact in labor economics is that the life cycle earnings proﬁle is
increasing and concave. In their recent review, Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) discuss
three leading sources for this pattern of earnings growth: human capital accumulation, job search and learning about job, worker or match quality. Human capital
theory argues that workers invest in human capital when they are young thus forgoing earnings and reaping the returns to investment when they become old. Search
theory argues that workers climb up a job ladder, moving from low-paying to highpaying jobs. When they are young, workers are more likely to be in the lower tail
of the earnings distribution. This triggers job-to-job mobility associated with higher
growth. As they age, the chance of accepting better outside options declines and
fewer job-to-job transitions and lower growth results. With learning earnings on the
job change as information is revealed and workers move from poor matches to better
ones resulting in across job earnings growth as well. Once the information has been
revealed and a good match attained growth subsides. All three of these explanations
have been studied extensively on their own and in isolation each can reproduce the
observed shape of the life cycle earnings proﬁle if not the full amount of growth.
Recently a new literature on quantifying the relative contributions of these sources
of life cycle earnings growth has developed. For the most part this new literature
has focussed on modeling the combination of human capital accumulation and job
search.1 Understanding the relative contributions of human capital accumulation and
job search to life cycle earnings growth is important since they have diﬀerent policy
implications concerning training on the one hand and labor market mobility on the
other hand. With very few exceptions this new literature uses structural models that
treat the human capital accumulation process as deterministic through an exogenous
learning-by-doing framework. Furthermore, they also commonly treat the search
process as exogenous (constant job oﬀer arrival rates). There are two papers that
treat the search process as exogenous but endogenize the human capital accumulation
process. In a largely conceptual rather than quantitative analysis, Rubinstein and
Weiss (2006) endogenizes human capital using a Ben-Porath style investment function.
Michelacci and Pijoan-Mas (2011) endogenizes the hours decision within a learningby-doing human capital accumulation model with exogenous search. However, their
focus is on inequality and not life cycle earnings growth. A common result in this
literature is that human capital is found to explain more earnings growth over the life
cycle than search. A recent exception is Bagger et al. (2011) who ﬁnd that, even with
human capital playing a dominant role early in the life cycle, search quickly overtakes
human capital and dominates earnings growth by the end of the life cycle.
1

Examples include Bunzel et al. (1999), Bagger et al. (2011), Barlevy (2008), Omer (2004),
Yamaguchi (2010), Burdett et al. (2011), Sim (2009), Carrillo-Tudela (2010), Prat (2010) and Pavan
(2011). Schönberg (2007) and Dustmann and Meghir (2005) are two examples using reduced form
analysis. Sanders (2011) is a recent paper that combines learning with job search.
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In contrast to these assumptions, we present a uniﬁed model where both human
capital investment and search intensity are endogenized to quantitatively examine the
relative contributions of both mechanisms and their potential interactions to earnings
growth over the life cycle. The decision-making in terms of human capital investment
and job search are likely to be diﬀerent within a uniﬁed framework. Consider a
uniﬁed model where workers, facing a distribution of the rental rate of human capital,
decide how much time to invest in general human capital within a Ben-Porath style
investment model and how much eﬀort to spend searching for a better job. Under this
scenario, there are likely three interactions between human capital accumulation and
job search. First, workers will likely invest more in human capital than they would
without job search and with only a ﬁxed rental rate of human capital. This is due
to the upward drift in the distribution of the rental rate of human capital, inherent
in the search model. Second, workers will likely spend more eﬀort searching with
human capital accumulation than without. This is because, without human capital
accumulation, the return to search is only realized for a ﬁxed level of human capital.
With human capital accumulation, the return to search is greater since it is now
realized for growing human capital. Third, because of human capital accumulation
on the job, workers will likely reduce their reservation rate while unemployed in order
to get a job to start accumulating human capital.2 For the most part the existing
literature has been able to identify only a subset of these interactions. For example,
Omer (2004) and Yamaguchi (2010) ﬁnd that the reservation wage (or match quality)
is lower with exogenous human capital accumulation than without, while Rubinstein
and Weiss (2006) point out that workers will invest more in human capital with
exogenous job search than without.
In addition to quantifying the full extent of the interactions between human capital
investment and job search eﬀort over the life cycle, we examine whether allowing for
the interactions within a uniﬁed model changes the implications for earnings growth.
Since Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) established that the amount of human capital
accumulated with (exogenous) job search and without is diﬀerent, it follows from the
arguments above that the amount of human capital accumulated will be diﬀerent if
the job search process is then endogenized. Furthermore, the job search process will
also change if it is endogenized. Mortensen (2003) shows that search intensity is a
decreasing function of wages. The workers who earn higher wages search less because
the chance for them to climb further up the job ladder is smaller. It is reasonable to
believe that workers with diﬀerent human capital levels also have diﬀerent incentives
to search. Unlike the existing literature, in our model search intensity depends on
workers’ human capital levels and the rental rates of human capital they currently
hold. In this way, the job oﬀer arrival rates diﬀer across worker attributes including
human capital levels, rental rates, and experience and age levels.3 Both of these
2

We examine post-schooling outcomes and do not allow workers to return to school and/or
training programs during unemployment.
3
Pavan (2008) also allows for more ﬂexibility in search technology, but he assumes the job arrival
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factors will contribute to job search and human capital accumulation having diﬀerent
roles over the life cycle and potentially a diﬀerent contribution to overall earnings
growth.
To conduct this study we combine a partial equilibrium search model with a human capital investment model.4 The search component of the model includes a search
eﬀort decision that determines the arrival rate of job oﬀers both on and oﬀ the job.
As is standard in search models reservation strategies are used to determine optimal transition patterns. In contrast to standard search models, here the reservation
strategies depend on the level of human capital as well as current earnings and employment states. In the model human capital is governed by a Ben-Porath investment
model where workers spend some of their working time investing in human capital
and thus trade oﬀ current earnings for future growth in earnings. We chose an investment model for several reasons. First, it is arguably the most common human
capital accumulation speciﬁcation in labor economics. Second, it allows for the human capital accumulation process to be a function of the current rental rate as well as
expected future rental rates derived through search. Third, there is evidence that the
learning-by-doing model can be rejected by the data in favor of an investment-style
model (see, for example, Belley (2011)). Finally, it allows us to contrast our results
with the other work in this area that assumes a learning-by-doing human capital
accumulation process.
In an attempt to better ﬁt the transition data we augment the model with unobserved heterogeneity in the search parameters (see Liu (2009) for details). We
then estimate the model using indirect inference. Through Monte Carlo simulations
of the estimation procedure we discovered that the ﬁnite-sample properties of the
structural parameter estimates rely on how much transition information, including
unemployment-to-job and job-to-job transitions, and earnings information are available over the full life cycle. The Monte Carlo exercises show that the estimates using
information from partial histories (e.g. the ﬁrst half of the life cycle) are less precise than those using the full life cycle.5 The Monte Carlo exercises also show that
augmenting early career histories from another data source, especially one with information on job-to-job transitions and earnings from the second half of the life cycle,
improves the precision of the parameter estimates. This is because earnings and transitions for older workers provide information for identifying search parameters due to
limited human capital investment by older workers. Thus, we estimate the models
using a relatively homogeneous cohort from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey
rates are explicit functions of a series of individual observable and unobservable characteristics,
rather than governed by a fundamental underlying mechanism.
4
We develop a ﬁnite-horizon model with a ﬁxed retirement date. This makes all of the decision
rules non-stationary and renders solving for the general equilibrium rental rate distribution very
diﬃcult. To our knowledge such a general equilibrium model has yet to be solved.
5
Yamaguchi (2010) and Pavan (2008) are two examples that estimate their models using the
NLSY and therefore only the ﬁrst half of the life cycle.
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of Youth (NLSY), with the help of additional information from all ages in the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
Based on the estimates from the model with unobserved search heterogeneity, the
interactions between human capital accumulation and job search are well supported
by the data. Because of job search, on average, workers invest more in human capital
throughout the life cycle: 56% more at the beginning of the life cycle than without
job search. Because of human capital accumulation, on average, workers reduce their
reservation rates while unemployed throughout the life cycle to less than half the
reservation rates without human capital accumulation. Furthermore, counterfactual
experiments show that a search model without human capital accumulation can generate around 46% of the total earnings growth, while a pure human capital model
can generate around 31% of the total earnings growth. The remaining 23% is due
to the interactions. Over the life cycle the strength of the components diﬀers with
job search dominating earnings growth earlier in the life cycle while human capital accumulation dominates later in the life cycle. In comparison to the rest of the
decomposition literature, our results highlight two important ﬁndings. First, endogenizing both components yields a substantial role for the interaction eﬀects of each
component on the other. Second, modeling search heterogeneity results not only in a
better ﬁt of the data, but also a reversal of the ordering of which component plays a
larger role.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The benchmark model is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the identiﬁcation and estimation strategies. Details on sample selection and construction of labor market histories are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses estimation results and model ﬁt, while Section 6 simulates individual behavior and conducts counterfactual experiments that examine the
interactions and quantify the relative contributions of each mechanism to life cycle
earnings growth. Section 7 concludes.

2

Model

2.1

The Environment

The model is built in the spirit of a Christensen et al. (2005) search model and a
Ben-Porath (1967) human capital production model. Workers enter the labor market
unemployed at period 1 and remain in the market until period T when they retire.
They maximize their expected earnings over T periods in the labor market by choosing
how much market time to invest in human capital and how much eﬀort to spend on
6

While our ﬁndings are consistent with Bagger et al. (2011) in that search overall plays a more
dominant role in explaining earnings growth over the life cycle, our results diﬀer from theirs in that
we ﬁnd search is the dominant factor early in the life cycle, not human capital.
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search. At each period, they can be either unemployed or employed. They may
transit between unemployment and employment as well as from job to job. Workers
face a non-degenerate distribution of the rental rate of human capital, F (R), which
is log-normally distributed. That is, ln(R) ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). Time is discrete. Workers
discount the future at a rate β.

2.2

Human Capital Production Technology

Workers are endowed with an initial stock of human capital, h0 , when they enter the
labor market. Human capital is assumed to be homogeneous and transferable across
jobs. Workers can only invest in human capital while on the job, and thus human
capital refers to skills that workers can only acquire through working. Following
Heckman et al. (1998), human capital does not depreciate.
Assume a simpliﬁed Ben-Porath human capital production function Q(h, i), where
h is the current human capital stock and i is the fraction of market time allocated to
human capital investment. Assume the production function Q(·, ·) is concave in both
h and i and takes the following speciﬁcation
Q(h, i) = a(hi)α ,
where 0 < α < 1 is a curvature parameter and a > 0 is a scale parameter which
represents learning ability. We assume learning ability is constant over time. Hence
the law of motion for human capital for employed workers at period t is
ht+1 = ht + a(ht it )α .

2.3

Search Technology

Job oﬀer arrival rates depend on workers’ search eﬀort. Following Mortensen (2003)
and Christensen et al. (2005) denote λ(s) as the job oﬀer arrival rate, an increasing
and concave function of search eﬀort s with a boundary condition λ(0) = 0. Assume
a linear production function for the job oﬀer arrival rate, i.e. λ(s) = λs, where λ
is a search eﬃciency parameter.7 Let c(s) be the search cost function, increasing,
strictly convex and twice diﬀerentiable, with boundary condition c(0) = c′s−→0 = 0.
The search cost function is assumed to take the following power form
c0 s1+γ
,
c(s) =
1+γ
where c0 > 0 is a scale parameter and 1 + γ (γ > 0) is the elasticity of search cost
with respect to search eﬀort. Here the search cost refers to the pecuniary disutility
associated with job search, not the opportunity cost of market time.
7

Following Liu (2009) we will let λ vary by type in the estimation in order to ﬁt the duration
and transition data better. However, here we suppress the type notation for convenience.
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2.4

Worker’s Problem

The state variables upon which workers make decisions include the employment state,
the current stock of human capital, and the current rental rate. Let Ut (h) denote the
value of being unemployed at period t and with human capital h. Let Vt (h, R) be
the value of working at a ﬁrm oﬀering a rental rate R at period t with human capital
h. The worker’s problem can be characterized recursively by two Bellman equations.
The Bellman equation for an unemployed worker is
∫ ∞
0
0
Ut (h) = max
bh − c(st ) + βλst
max{Ut+1 (h), Vt+1 (h, R)}dF (R)
0
st

+β(1 −

0

λs0t )Ut+1 (h)

s.t
0 ≤ λs0t ≤ 1

(1)

At period t, an unemployed worker receives some amount of compensation, bh, which
is proportional to his stock of human capital in that period. It may include unemployment beneﬁts as well as other forms of income workers receive while unemployed.
The assumption that the unemployment compensation is proportional to worker’s
human capital makes the model easier to solve. Furthermore, it is not hard to justify if unemployed workers engage in home production or other forms of non-market
activities which presumably depend on productivity or if unemployment beneﬁts are
a function of past wages.8 We assume b, the replacement rate for the unemployed,
is constant over time and independent of h and r.9 At the beginning of period t,
given human capital, h, the worker must decide how much eﬀort, s0t , to expend on
job search which in turn determines the job oﬀer arrival rate at the end of period t.
At the end of period t with probability λs0t , the worker receives a job oﬀer R from
the oﬀer distribution F (R). The worker has to immediately decide whether to accept
that oﬀer by comparing the value of working at period t + 1 to the value of staying
unemployed at period t + 1. With probability 1 − λs0t , the worker does not receive an
oﬀer and remains unemployed in period t + 1.
The Bellman equation for an employed worker who works at a ﬁrm oﬀering R
8
9

Similar settings can be found in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Burdett et al. (2011).
These assumptions are useful for identiﬁcation and for keeping the state space manageable.
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with human capital h at period t is
Vt (h, R) =

max Rh(1 − it ) − c(s1t ) + β(1 − δ)(1 − λs1t ) max{Vt+1 (h′ , R), Ut+1 (h′ )}
∫ ∞
1
+β(1 − δ)λst
max{Vt+1 (h′ , R′ ), Vt+1 (h′ , R), Ut+1 (h′ )}dF (R′ )

{s1t ,it }

+βδUt+1 (h′ )

0

s.t
0 ≤ it ≤ 1,
0 ≤ λs1t ≤ 1
h′ = h + a(hit )α .

(2)

At the beginning of period t given human capital stock h and rental rate R, an
employed worker has to decide not only how much eﬀort s1t to spend searching for a
better job but also how much time it to invest in human capital. Earnings for this
period depend on how much time is devoted to market production, i.e. Rh(1 − it ).
Search activity is assumed to not aﬀect earnings in the current period because it incurs
only monetary costs, not opportunity costs of market time. On the one hand, this
serves as an identiﬁcation assumption that allows for the identiﬁcation of the human
capital production function using within job earnings variation as such variation is
only driven by human capital investment under the current settings. On the other
hand, this makes search costs independent of the level of human capital. If search
costs also included the opportunity costs of market time, workers with more human
capital would exert less search eﬀort. At the end of period t, the job can be destroyed
with probability δ in which case the worker returns to unemployment in period t + 1.
With probability (1 − δ)λs1t , the job is not destroyed and the worker receives a new
job oﬀer R′ at the end of period t. The worker then must decide whether to accept
the new job oﬀer R′ by comparing the value of working at the new job in period t + 1
to that of staying with the current job in period t + 1 with the new human capital
h′ . The worker may also decide with the new human capital level h′ to transition to
unemployment if that state now dominates. With probability (1 − δ)(1 − λs1t ), the job
is not destroyed and the worker receives no oﬀers and decides between staying with
the current job in period t + 1 and transitioning to unemployment. Human capital
grows due to investment and human capital in period t + 1 is determined by the law
of motion.
It can be shown from backward induction that Ut (h) is increasing in h and Vt (h, R)
is increasing in both h and R. Given these properties of the value functions, unemployed workers adopt the following reservation rental rate strategy: only oﬀers that
are at least as good as the reservation rental rate, denoted by ϕt (h) and determined
by Ut (h) = Vt (h, ϕt (h)), are accepted. Using the reservation rental rate strategies,
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equation (1) can be simpliﬁed as follows.
Ut (h)

=

max
bh −
0
st

c(s0t )

+

∫

βλs0t

∞

(Vt+1 (h, R) − Ut+1 (h)) dF (R)

ϕt+1 (h)

+βUt+1 (h)
s.t.
0 ≤ λs0t ≤ 1.

(3)

For employed workers, the reservation rental rate, at which workers are indiﬀerent
between accepting the new oﬀer and staying with the current job, is the current
rental rate, since human capital is general and transferable between jobs. Allowing
for endogenous quits to unemployment from employment complicates the transitions
in that a worker now has to decide, given the new level of human capital, whether to
remain at the current job or switch to unemployment or accept a new job, if oﬀered.
These decisions depend on the relationship between R′ (the new oﬀer if available), R,
and ϕt+1 (h′ ). For a worker whose current rental rate R is higher than the updated
unemployment reservation rental rates ϕt+1 (h′ ), the decision is the same as the case
when endogenous quits to unemployment are not allowed. In this case, the worker’s
problem can be simpliﬁed to
Vt (h, R)

=

max
Rh(1 − it ) − c(s1t ) + β(1 − δ)Vt+1 (h′ , R) + βδUt+1 (h′ )
1
{st ,it }
∫ ∞
1
(Vt+1 (h′ , R′ ) − Vt+1 (h′ , R)) dF (R′ )
+β(1 − δ)λst
R

s.t.
0 ≤ it ≤ 1,
0 ≤ λs1t ≤ 1
h′ = h + a(hit )α .

(4)

For a worker whose current rental rate R is lower than ϕt+1 (h′ ), the decision will be
to quit to unemployment unless they receive a new job oﬀer such that R′ > ϕt+1 (h′ ),
in which case they will accept the new oﬀer and remain employed. That is,
Vt (h, R) = max
Rh(1 − it ) − c(s1t ) + βUt+1 (h′ )
{s1t ,it }
∫ ∞
1
+β(1 − δ)λst
(Vt+1 (h′ , R′ ) − Ut+1 (h′ )) dF (R′ ).

(5)

ϕt+1 (h′ )

Endogenous quits to unemployment generally do not arise in standard search models,
because the environment is stationary. However, in our model, the ﬁnite working
lifetime makes the model non-stationary and under many parameter speciﬁcations
the reservation rental rate increases over time as search eﬀort and human capital
investment returns diminish. This is especially true as one gets closer to the last
period where for all values of h the reservation rental rate is equal to b.
10

2.5

Analysis of Model Properties

Given its complexity, the model is analytically intractable and hence is solved numerically.10 Without loss of generality we assume that at period T + 1, UT +1 = VT +1 = 0.
Therefore, for period T , UT (h) = bh, VT (h, R) = Rh, and ϕT (h) = b since neither
search nor human capital investment takes place. The policy functions and value functions for periods prior to T are solved by backward induction based on the following
three ﬁrst order conditions:11
∫ ∞
′ 0
c (st ) = βλ
(Vt+1 (h, R) − Ut+1 (h)) dF (R),
(6)
ϕt+1 (h)

c

′

∫
(s1t )

= β(1 − δ)λ

∞

(Vt+1 (h′ , R′ ) − Vt+1 (h′ , R)) dF (R′ ),

(7)

R

and
∂h′
Rh = β
∂it

(

∂Ut+1 (h′ )
∂Vt+1 (h′ , R)
+
(1
−
δ)
∂h′
∂h′
)
)
∫ ∞(
′
′
∂Vt+1 (h , R ) ∂Vt+1 (h′ , R)
1
′
+(1 − δ)λst
−
dF (R ) .
∂h′
∂h′
R
δ

(8)

Search intensity for unemployed workers s0t increases in h, because the marginal
returns to search, the RHS of equation (6), are higher for workers with more human
capital. The interactions between human capital investment and job search are such
that with human capital accumulation unemployed workers, on average, spend more
eﬀort on search and reduce their reservation rental rates. The intuition is simple.
Human capital accumulation makes employment relatively more attractive compared
to unemployment. On the one hand, workers receive constant compensation bh and
see no growth in human capital while unemployed. On the other hand, they may
augment their human capital and locate better outside oﬀers while employed. It is also
important that the search technology and search costs are the same for the employed
and the unemployed. This encourages unemployed workers to exit unemployment as
quickly as possible by searching more intensively and lowering their reservation rental
rates. Hence s0t is higher and the reservation rental rate ϕt+1 (h) is lower than without
human capital growth.
Search intensity for employed workers s1t increases in h because search is more
valuable for individuals with more human capital. It decreases in R because a worker
with a higher R is less likely to move up the job ladder and more likely to stay with the
10

We have solved a simpliﬁed 3-period model analytically. Under some suﬃcient conditions, we
were able to show that s0 is increasing in h, s1 is increasing in h and decreasing in R, and h′ is
increasing in h and decreasing in R.
11
For simplicity, we present and discuss only the case where the current rental rate is higher than
the reservation rental rates and thus no voluntary exits to unemployment occur.

11

current job. Therefore the return to search, the RHS of equation (7), is decreasing in
R. The on-the-job search intensity with human capital growth is higher than without,
since the marginal return to search is higher than it would be with no human capital
growth.
As in the human capital literature, human capital investment it is decreasing in h
due to the concavity of the human capital production function. However, unlike the
pure human capital literature, it is now a function of the rental rate because of job
search. In particular, it is decreasing in R, because the marginal returns to investment
now include the returns to search. That is, the marginal returns to investment, the
RHS of equation (8), not only include the marginal returns if workers stay with the
same job as is the case without search, but also include the marginal returns if workers
transition due to search. The higher R is the more likely workers stay with the same
job and the less likely they switch to a better job decreasing the incentives to invest.
In addition, the possibility of job destruction makes investing in human capital risky.
Both of these factors lead to declining investment in human capital as the rental rate
increases. However, conditional on R, workers invest more in human capital in the
presence of job search than without as they can foresee their rental rates increasing
in the future through job search, the third term on the RHS of equation (8).

3

Estimation

In order to better ﬁt the duration and transition data, we follow Liu (2009) and allow
for unobserved heterogeneity in the arrival rate parameter λ.12 In particular, we specify two types of workers such that λ1 ≤ λ2 with the fraction of type 1 workers equal
to p. Thus, the parameters of interest include seven parameters related to search
frictions (λ1 , λ2 , δ, b, c0 , γ, and p), two human capital production function parameters (a and α), the initial human capital level (h0 ), and two rental rate distribution
parameters (µ and σ). Here we invoke common normalizations for identiﬁcation purposes. With regard to the search parameters Christensen et al. (2005) show that λi ,
c0 and γ cannot be separately identiﬁed since search intensity is not observable. As is
commonly done, we normalize c0 to 1. It is also well known in the human capital literature that one cannot separately identify the level of human capital from the rental
rate. This is mainly because we only observe the product of human capital and the
rental rate. In the usual case of a single rental rate, the rental rate is normalized to
some particular value so that it is possible to interpret human capital in a pecuniary
sense. With the integration of job search and human capital accumulation such a
normalization does not resolve the issue. It is possible to achieve identiﬁcation in
12

Liu (2009) modiﬁed a similar model along a number of possible dimensions to achieve a better
ﬁt to the duration and transition data. He determined that heterogeneity in λ led to the best
improvement. Subsequently we have analyzed other extensions including allowing for heterogeneity
in both λ and δ and again have settled on heterogeneity in λ.
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our setting by normalizing the initial human capital level and we do so by setting h0
to 100. In this way, the rental rate distribution parameters can be estimated with
available data. We also set an upper limit on the rental rate distribution equal to 30.
This value yields weekly earnings at the top of the distribution around 3000, similar
to what we ﬁnd in the SIPP data.13 Finally, the discount factor β is set to .99. This
follows the convention in the literature that β = 1/(1 + r) with the interest rate r set
equal to roughly 1% per quarter which amounts to a real annual interest rate of 4%.
The rest of the parameters are estimated via indirect inference (Gourieroux et al.
(1993)). Indirect inference is a generalization of the method of simulated moments.
It is particularly useful when a model is not analytically tractable. The main idea
is to ﬁnd a set of structural parameters that minimize the distance between a set of
moments from the real data and the model-predicted counterparts of these moments
based on simulated data from the structural model. The set of moments that are
matched can be viewed as a set of auxiliary parameters from a set of auxiliary models.
These auxiliary models can be structural or reduced form and they should capture
the main features of the original structural model.

3.1

Auxiliary Model

One of the key issues in using indirect inference is to ﬁnd moments or auxiliary models that help identify all of the parameters. From the search literature it is known
that the search friction parameters can be identiﬁed through transition information
including transitions between unemployment and employment and job-to-job transitions. Recall in the model that the hazard rate out of an unemployment spell at
period t for a type i worker is λi s0t (ht )(1 − F (ϕt (ht ))) and the job-to-job hazard rate
at a ﬁrm oﬀering R is equal to (1 − δ)λi s1t (ht , R)(1 − F (R)), assuming R ≥ ϕt+1 (ht+1 ).
Examining how outcomes of unemployment-to-employment transitions and job-to-job
transitions respond to variations in h and R can help reveal the underlying search parameters, λi and γ. Although h and R are not observable in data, they can be approximated by work experience, job tenure, and earnings. Finally, duration dependence
in the unemployment-to-employment transitions helps to separately identify λ1 and
λ2 as well as p. Thus we regress binary outcomes of unemployment-to-employment
transitions against actual work experience and unemployment duration, and binary
outcomes of job-to-job transitions against actual work experience, job tenure, and
earnings to reveal the underlying relationship between search intensity and h and R.
Let Yi,k,t be a binary choice variable for individual i during unemployment spell k
at period t, with 1 for exit and 0 for otherwise. Let xi,t be the actual work experience,
13

If we do not impose this limit, for high values of b the estimates can yield a low mean, high
variance rental rate distribution such that the oﬀer rejection rate out of unemployment is extremely
high and on-the-job search yields earnings at the top of the distribution more than double that found
in the data.
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i.e. total labor market experience net of unemployment durations, of individual i at
period t. Denote uduri,k,t as the cumulative duration for individual i’s k th unemployment spell at period t. Then
2
Yi,k,t = β0 + β1 xi,t + β2 x2i,t + β3 uduri,k,t + β4 uduri,k,t
+ ui,k,t ,

(9)

where ui,k,t is an error term. Similarly, for job-to-job transitions, let Yi,j,t be a binary
choice variable for job spell j at period t of individual i, with 1 for a job-to-job
transition and 0 otherwise. Let Ti,j,t be the tenure at period t for job j, wi,j,t be
earnings on job j at period t for individual i.
2
2
+ ui,j,t ,
+ β10 wi,j,t + β11 wi,j,t
Yi,j,t = β5 + β6 xi,t + β7 x2i,t + β8 Ti,j,t + β9 Ti,j,t

(10)

where ui,j,t is again an error term.
Earnings growth in the model is a result of both human capital accumulation and
job switching. Nevertheless, on the same job, earnings grow solely due to human
capital accumulation. Hence regressing within-job earnings growth against actual
experience and job tenure helps identify the human capital production function parameters, a and α. Let ln wi,j,t be log earnings of individual i on job j at period t.
Deﬁne ∆ ln wi,j,t = ln wi,j,t − ln wi,j,t−1 .
2
∆ ln wi,j,t = β12 + β13 xi,t + β14 x2i,t + β15 Ti,j,t + β16 Ti,j,t
+ ϵi,j,t ,

(11)

where ϵi,j,t is the corresponding error term.
A Mincerian earnings regression helps identify the rental rate distribution parameters µ and σ. In addition to actual experience and job tenure, we also include djj in
the regression, a job-to-job transition indicator with value equal to 1 if the state prior
to the current job is another job and 0 if not. The model predicts that, on average,
earnings following job-to-job transitions are higher. Let ln wi,j,t be log earnings at
period t for individual i on job j.
2
ln wi,j,t = β17 + β18 xi,t + β19 x2i,t + β20 Ti,j,t + β21 Ti,j,t
+ β22 djji,j,t + νi,j,t .

(12)

Given the assumption of a common level of initial human capital, variations in
initial earnings on ﬁrst jobs and job-to-job transitions following ﬁrst jobs come solely
from variation in R. Such information helps identify the variance of the rental rate
distribution, σ. The mean of initial earnings of ﬁrst jobs also helps to identify the
mean of the distribution, µ, given that h0 is normalized to 100. Let ln wi,1 and Yi,1 be
the logarithm of earnings at the start of the ﬁrst job and the ﬁrst job-to-job transition
of individual i on the ﬁrst job, respectively. Let jduri,1 be the total duration of the
ﬁrst job for individual i. Following the above argument, we include in the auxiliary
model the mean and standard deviation of initial earnings on the ﬁrst jobs, ln wi,1
and σln wi,1 , and coeﬃcients from the following regression:
2
Yi,1 = β23 + β24 jduri,1 + β25 jduri,1
+ εi .
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(13)

The job destruction rate δ is assumed to be the same for everyone and constant
over time. In the auxiliary model it is identiﬁed from data on the fraction of workers
in the NLSY who exit employment in each period since in the model this value is
the sum of δ and the endogenous exit rate from employment implied by the other
parameter estimates. The replacement rate for unemployed workers b aﬀects the
reservation rental rates and is equal to the reservation rental rate at period T . Hence
minimum earnings levels at period T , wT , particularly amongst those who recently
transitioned from unemployment can help identify b.

3.2

Monte Carlo Exercise

To conﬁrm if the auxiliary model proposed above contains enough information to
identify all the model parameters, we conducted a small Monte Carlo exercise which
is described in Appendix A. The results from the Monte Carlo exercise revealed that
the estimates using the proposed auxiliary model were very close to the true values
indicating that the auxiliary model can recover the true parameters. The estimates
were also very precise if all the information used to calculate the moments is available
over the full life cycle. However, the estimates are much nosier if only a subset of the
life cycle is observed. Finally, the Monte Carlo exercises revealed that the precision
of the estimates could be improved if the auxiliary model was augmented with an
additional data source that contains information on the full life cycle.
Since the primary choice of data set for this study, the NLSY, does not cover the
full working life of the sample participants,14 we chose to augment the information
in the NLSY with information covering the full life cycle from the 1996 wave of the
SIPP.15 In order to provide information on the full life cycle, we constructed synthetic
proﬁles of job-to-job transitions and earnings over 40 years in the SIPP and included
SIPP versions of equations (10) and (12) in the auxiliary model. One concern with the
synthetic cohorts from the SIPP is that they may have faced diﬀerent parameter values
than the NLSY cohort. In the observed data the shape of the overall proﬁles of jobto-job transitions and earnings are quite similar for the age range that overlaps in the
NLSY and the SIPP. However, the intercept terms are diﬀerent. Thus, to control for
potential cohort eﬀects introduced by combining the NLSY and the SIPP, we do not
include the intercept terms from equations (10) and (12) for the SIPP in the indirect
inference estimation. A second concern with the SIPP entails the small sample size of
older workers who transition from unemployment to employment, the sample used in
the Monte Carlo exercises to identify b. In addition, the SIPP is known to underreport
wages (Abowd and Stinson (2011)). Thus, instead of estimating b within the indirect
inference estimation procedure, we choose the value of b by comparing the implied
earnings at the end of the life cycle and those in the SIPP data for workers who
14
15

The majority of individuals in our ﬁnal sample only have 20 years of labor market history.
The SIPP is a representative panel with a relatively short duration of only 4 years.
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are within one year and ﬁve years of age 65. Our preferred value of b is 1.8 which
results in a smallest earnings level of 120 in the last 5 years and 137 in the last year
of employment.16
In summary, our ﬁnal auxiliary model uses a combination of data from the NLSY
covering the ﬁrst 20 years of the life cycle and from the SIPP covering the full 40
years of the life cycle. More formally, denote θ as the set of parameters of interest
that need to be estimated. That is, θ = {λ1 , λ2 , δ, γ, a, α, µ, σ, p}. Denote ρ as the
vector of auxiliary parameters, whose consistent estimator based on the real data is
ρ̂. Here ρ includes all the regression coeﬃcients from equations (9) to (13) for the
ﬁrst 20 years, the mean and standard deviation of initial earnings on the ﬁrst jobs,
the fraction of employed workers making job to unemployment transitions in the ﬁrst
20 years, and the slope coeﬃcients from the following two regressions for the full 40
years of the life cycle,
Yi,j,t = β26 + β27 exi,t + β28 ex2i,t + ui,j,t ,

(14)

ln wi,j,t = β29 + β30 exi,t + β31 ex2i,t + νi,j,t .

(15)

and
where exi,t is the potential experience of individual i at period t. Let ρ̂(θ)s be the
consistent estimator of ρ from the artiﬁcial data generated from one simulation of
the structural model, indexed by s. Let ρ̂(θ) be the average of S simulations, ρ̂(θ) =
(1/S)ΣSs=1 ρ̂(θ)s . Then the consistent estimator of θ, via indirect inference, is given
by
θ̂ = arg min(ρ̂(θ) − ρ̂)′ W ∗ (ρ̂(θ) − ρ̂),
(16)
where W ∗ is the optimal weighting matrix, which is equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of ρ̂, V ar(ρ̂)−1 . The minimization is implemented using simulated
annealing (Goﬀe et al. (1994)) and the optimal weighting matrix is obtained through
bootstrapping.

4

Data

As discussed in the previous section, the NLSY and the SIPP are used in the estimation. The NLSY consists of 12,686 individuals who were 14 to 21 years old as of
January 1979. It contains a nationally representative core random sample, an oversample of blacks and Hispanics, and a special military over-sample. Respondents
were interviewed annually since 1979 until 1994 and once every two years after 1994.
Detailed information on employment and schooling was collected. For this analysis,
16

The lowest 4 earnings values in the SIPP data are 78, 105, 119 and 125 for workers within 5
years of age 65 and 119, 146, 146 and 167 for workers within one year of age 65. The sample sizes
are 1738 and 248, respectively.
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only the core sample is used. As for the SIPP, the 1996 panel is used which covers 4 years. The SIPP sample is a multistage-stratiﬁed sample of the U.S. civilian
non-institutionalized population. All household members 15 years old and over are
interviewed by self-response or proxy response every 4 months. Core information on
labor force status, program participation and income for the past 4 months is asked
at each interview. Both data sets provide instruments with which jobs can be linked
across interviews and thus individual labor market histories can be constructed.

4.1

Sample Selection

In both data sets, only white males who are high school graduates and do not pursue
further schooling are selected to maintain homogeneity. Those who had ever been
self-employed, family workers, served in military, or retired are also excluded from
both samples. In the NLSY, we select only those who graduated from high school
after 1978, since constructing employment histories prior to 1978 is not possible in
the NLSY, and before 1984 in order to have more homogeneous cohorts and longer
labor market histories. In the SIPP, we restrict the sample to those who were high
school graduates as of January 1996.
In both samples, a job is deﬁned as an employment relationship that consists of
at least 35 hours a week and lasts longer than 4 weeks.17 In the NLSY, these fulltime jobs have to start within three years after high school graduation to guarantee
the school-to-work transition.18 If the ﬁrst full-time job happens to surround the
graduation date, it is used as the ﬁrst spell only if it is held at least 2 months after
graduation. This eliminates temporary or summer jobs held while still in school. To
deal with overlapping jobs, those jobs that are covered entirely by other longer jobs
are dropped. For those jobs that only overlap in part, the starting dates of the later
jobs are replaced with the stopping dates of the earlier jobs. In both samples, if a job
is indicated as still ongoing at the last interview, the job is right-censored.
Weekly earnings are used and converted to 2000 dollars in both samples. In the
NLSY, respondents are asked the time unit of the rate of pay and the corresponding
rate of pay. If an individual is not paid weekly, the rate of pay is then converted to
weekly earnings using hours information. In the SIPP, monthly earnings are recorded.
Hence, weekly earnings are then equal to monthly earnings divided by actual weeks
worked for that particular month. In both samples, earnings are trimmed 1% at the
top and bottom of the distributions.
17

The focus on full-time jobs is standard in the literature. See, for example, Bowlus et al. (2001),
Eckstein and Wolpin (1995), Wolpin (1992), Yamaguchi (2010), Topel and Ward (1992), and Rendon
(2006).
18
See Bowlus et al. (2001) for details.
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4.2

Quarterly Histories

Since the model period is a quarter (13 weeks), quarterly labor market histories
since high school graduation are constructed for the two samples. The quarterly
histories are constructed according to the following rules. First, the calendar quarter
that contains the high school graduation date is set as the ﬁrst quarter in the labor
market.19 Second, employment states are determined based on the major activity
occurring during a particular calendar quarter.20 A worker is classiﬁed as employed
during a quarter if he works at a legitimate job based on the aforementioned deﬁnition
the majority of that quarter, i.e. greater than 7 weeks. Otherwise, he is classiﬁed
as unemployed during that quarter. Third, the job of the quarter is deﬁned as the
one that a worker stays with the longest during that quarter, given he is employed
during that quarter. Earnings on this job during that quarter is then deﬁned as
the earnings for the quarter. Fourth, the quarterly transitions are determined based
on the employment states and jobs held during two consecutive quarters. A worker
makes an unemployment-to-job transition if he is unemployed in the current quarter
and employed in the next quarter. A worker makes a job-to-job transition if he
changes jobs between two quarters.
The ﬁnal sample consists of 446 individuals from the NLSY with 2424 full-time
jobs and 1395 unemployment spells in total, and 5109 individuals from the SIPP
with 7293 full-time jobs and 1254 unemployment spells. Due to its longer panel,
the right-censoring rate in the NLSY sample is low: 13% and 11%, respectively,
for unemployment and job spells. However the censoring rate is high in the SIPP
sample due to its shorter panel: 29% and 68% for unemployment and job spells,
respectively. Based on the quarterly histories constructed from the NLSY, a typical
high school graduate holds 5.4 full-time jobs over the ﬁrst 20 years and makes 2.7
job-to-job transitions and 2.1 job-to-unemployment transitions. An unemployment
spell on average lasts for 5.7 quarters21 and a job spell lasts for 13 quarters.
Table 1 shows several quarterly statistics for 4 potential experience groups for the
NLSY sample and 4 additional groups for the SIPP sample. Full-time work experience
increases from 6.7 quarters over the ﬁrst 5 years to 51 quarters if one has been in the
labor market for 16 to 20 years. Job seniority increases from 4.2 quarters over the ﬁrst
5 years to 23 quarters if one has been in the market for 16 to 20 years. As experience
and job seniority increase, average weekly earnings increase from $445 to $685 over
the same period of time. Average weekly earnings grow at a decreasing rate. From
year 5 to year 10, average weekly earnings increases by $124, then $69 from years 10
19

Similar settings can be found in Wolpin (1992) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1995).
There are generally two ways to construct quarterly histories. One is to use the information at
the ﬁrst week of a particular quarter. The other is to use the major activity of a particular quarter.
Yamaguchi (2010) and Rendon (2006) use the former, while Topel and Ward (1992) and Wolpin
(1992) use the latter.
21
By construction, an unemployment spell may include jobs that do not qualify as full-time jobs.
20
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Table 1: Quarterly Statistics
NLSY
6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16-20 Years
23.12
40.12
57.08
(8.45)
(11.49)
(15.13)
Job Tenure (quarters)
10.63
16.72
23.07
(9.96)
(15.81)
(22.14)
Weekly Earnings
569.05
638.33
685.38
(254.61)
(262.32)
(293.56)
Quarterly Within-Job Earnings Growth
0.008
0.004
0.003
(0.080)
(0.067)
(0.056)
Quarterly Between-Job Earnings Growth
0.032
0.042
0.009
(0.229)
(0.207)
(0.167)
Fraction of Employed Workers who Transition
0.049
0.033
0.028
from Job-to-Job (per quarter)
(0.216)
(0.178)
(0.164)
Fraction of Unemployed Workers who
0.166
0.118
0.070
Transition to a Job (per quarter)
(0.373)
(0.323)
(0.255)
SIPP
Mean
21-25 Years 26-30 Years 31-35 Years 36-40 Years
Weekly Earnings
686.60
675.58
701.12
750.80
(307.87)
(308.71)
(335.81)
(349.21)
Quarterly Within-Job Earnings Growth
0.000
0.001
-0.000
0.001
(0.230)
(0.228)
(0.218)
(0.225)
Quarterly Between-Job Earnings Growth
0.029
0.089
0.055
-0.083
(0.440)
(0.623)
(0.554)
(0.597)
Fraction of Employed Workers who Transition
0.026
0.021
0.020
0.013
from Job-to-Job (per quarter)
(0.159)
(0.143)
(0.141)
(0.114)
Mean
Actual Experience (quarters)

1-5 Years
6.74
(5.41)
4.22
(4.76)
444.51
(203.33)
0.019
(0.106)
0.035
(0.261)
0.063
(0.243)
0.214
(0.411)
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to 15 and $47 from years 15 to 20. From the SIPP data we show statistics for older
workers who are missing from the NLSY panel. Average weekly earnings in the SIPP
for those who have been in the labor market for 21 to 25 years is very similar to that
in the NLSY for those in the market for 16-20 years.22 The SIPP does show higher
average earnings for older workers with an average of $751 for worker who have been
in the market 36 to 40 years.
In terms of earnings growth we present two statistics: average within-job earnings
growth across two quarters for those staying with the same job and average betweenjob earnings growth across two quarters for those changing jobs. On average, a high
school graduate can expect earnings growth of 2% per quarter on the job over the
ﬁrst 5 years. This amounts to about 8% per year. This growth declines over time,
down to 0.3% per quarter if one has been in the market for 16 to 20 years. After
20 years the SIPP data reveal almost no within-job earnings growth. Job switching
results in earnings growth of 3.5% per quarter over the ﬁrst 5 years, which is twice
as high as the growth on the job over the same period of time. The between-job
earnings growth does not decrease as much as the within-job earnings growth in the
NLSY and the SIPP data show very noisy patterns of gains and losses toward the
end of the life cycle.
In terms of transitions across states the NLSY reveals that the likelihood of making a job-to-job transition declines as experience levels increase with the SIPP data
showing a leveling oﬀ. With respect to transitions out of unemployment the NLSY
sample indicates a quite sharp decline as experience levels increase with the SIPP
showing a ﬂat pattern.23 The discrepancies between the NLSY and the SIPP in some
of the transition information (earnings growth and unemployment to job transitions
especially) are behind our decision to only include information on these patterns in
the data for the ﬁrst 20 years, i.e. only use the NLSY data. The exclusion of this
information in the auxiliary model is unlikely to have a big impact on the parameter
estimates as shown in the previous Monte Carlo exercises. Additional issues encountered during estimation due to the nature of the data and our solutions are discussed
in Appendix B.
22

As noted above the SIPP has a lower intercept for its earnings-potential experience proﬁle than
the NLSY.
23
The fraction of unemployed workers transitioning to a job in the SIPP is somewhat ﬂat over
time, ranging from 29% for the ﬁrst 5 years to 23% for the 30 to 35 years in the labor market.
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5
5.1

Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates

The parameter estimates for the estimated model are presented in Table 2. Our
preferred speciﬁcation with b=1.8 is given in the ﬁrst column. The results show that
there is substantial heterogeneity in terms of search eﬃciency in the data, with 42%
being type 1 and 58% type 2. Type 2 workers are almost 5 times more eﬃcient in
searching than type 1 workers and hence receive job oﬀers faster conditional on the
same search eﬀort. For one unit of search eﬀort the job oﬀer arrival probability is only
2.9% per quarter for type 1 workers, while it is 14.2% for type 2 workers. The average
job oﬀer arrival rate among the two types is 9% per quarter. This estimate is larger
than those found by other models with endogenous search intensity.24 The estimate of
the search cost curvature parameter γ is 9.16 and is much higher than those found by
other studies.25 This diﬀerence is due to the presence of human capital accumulation
in our model. Because of human capital accumulation, search intensity is not only a
decreasing function of the rental rate but also an increasing function of human capital
level. Thus, search eﬀort has to be more costly to maintain the same job oﬀer arrival
rate at a given level of observed earnings.26 In terms of job destruction, δ is estimated
to be 0.03 which is the average employment to unemployment exit rate in the NLSY
suggesting very little role for endogenous job separations in the model.
Turning to the parameter estimates of the human capital production function we
ﬁnd that the learning ability parameter a is estimated to be 0.24, a value that is much
larger than those found in the human capital literature.27 In contrast, the curvature
parameter α is smaller at 0.024 than values found in the human capital literature.28
In a human capital model, the parameter α governs the shape of age-earnings proﬁle.
The higher α is the more time workers invest in human capital in the beginning of the
life cycle and hence the more concave the age-earnings proﬁle is. In the human capital
literature, a larger α is estimated compared to our model with search heterogeneity.
This is because the only way to generate a concave age-earnings proﬁle in the pure
human capital model is to have a large α. However, with heterogeneity in the search
24

Lise (2011) ﬁnds that λ is 0.19 per year using the NLSY, implying roughly a job oﬀer arrival
probability of 5% per quarter.
25
Lise (2011) ﬁnds that the search cost curvature is 1.17 using the NLSY. Christensen et al. (2005)
ﬁnd the search cost function is very close to a quadratic using Danish data.
26
Consider search intensity under two observed earnings, w1 = rh1 and w2 = rh2 with h1 < h2 .
The search intensity at w1 will be higher than at w2 in studies with only endogenous search eﬀort.
However, search intensity at w2 will be higher because of higher h2 in our model. This implies a
more costly search in our model to maintain a similar job oﬀer arrival rate.
27
For example, Heckman et al. (1998) ﬁnd that a is around 0.08 for high school graduates using
the NLSY.
28
Browning et al. (1999) ﬁnds the curvature estimates in the human capital literature range from
0.5 to almost 1.
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Table 2: Model
b = 1.8
h0
100
c
1
β
0.99
λ1 0.029
(0.002)
λ2 0.142
(0.008)
p
0.417
(0.028)
γ
9.162
(0.180)
δ
0.030
(0.001)
a
0.236
(0.053)
α
0.024
(0.024)
µ
1.266
(0.013)
σ
0.461
(0.019)

Parameter Estimates
b = 1.7 b = 1.9
100
100
1
1
0.99
0.99
0.032
0.040
(0.003) (0.003)
0.163
0.185
(0.012) (0.011)
0.470
0.417
(0.047) (0.034)
11.875
8.819
(0.509) (0.545)
0.030
0.030
(0.001) (0.001)
0.249
0.066
(0.054) (0.011)
0.024
0.069
(0.021) (0.036)
1.276
0.955
(0.012) (0.018)
0.452
0.670
(0.018) (0.014)

technology, it is not necessary to have a large curvature parameter for the human
capital production function because job search per se, especially amongst the type
2 workers, can generate a concave age-earnings proﬁle. The mean of the logarithm
of the rental rate is 1.27 and the standard deviation is 0.46. Thus for one unit of
human capital, the mean rental rate is about 3.9 per week. The implied rental rate
distribution is disperse and skewed to the right with a long right tail.

5.2

Model Fit

Table 3 tabulates the moments used in the estimation and those generated by the
model. The model does well in matching the earnings-related moments which include
the log earnings regression (equation (12)) and the initial earnings distribution from
the NLSY, and the overall earnings proﬁle (equation (15)) from the SIPP. The model
also does a reasonable job matching the transition data. Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁt of
the model graphically. Much of the decline in the job-to-job transition proﬁles as seen
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in the NLSY and the SIPP (parts (c) and (d)) is replicated by the model. Unlike a
model with homogeneous search parameters which generates a ﬂat unemployment-tojob transition proﬁle (Liu (2009)), the model with search heterogeneity does generate
an initial decline for the unemployment-to-job transition proﬁle (part (e)). However,
it misses the higher exit rate out of unemployment for very young workers and the
subsequent decline in the exit rate as workers age. For the most part this is due to
(1) the very high exit rate for type 2 workers such that mainly type 1 workers remain
in unemployment after a few periods and (2) not enough variation over time in the
reservation rental rate as in the homogeneous search model. In terms of earnings
proﬁles, the model matches both the NLSY and the SIPP very well.
Note that the coeﬃcient on djj, a dummy variable for job-to-job transitions in
the log earnings regression, is much higher in the model than in the data (Table 3).
This is because in the model job-to-job transitions only happen when workers receive
a better oﬀer. However, this may not be the case in reality. Bowlus and Neumann
(2006) document almost 34% of voluntary job changes for job-related reason result in
a wage decline, not to mention job changes for non job-related reasons. Finally, the
model generates smaller within-job earnings growth compared to the data (Table 3).
This appears to be a consequence of adding heterogenous job search to the model.
Fitting the job-to-job transitions well results in a model that can produce a concave
earnings proﬁle with a reasonable amount of earnings growth over the life cycle. Less
human capital investment is then needed to ﬁt the overall earnings proﬁle. This
results in lower estimates for the human capital parameters and subsequently lower
on-the-job earnings growth.29

5.3

Sensitivity to Choice of b

In Table 2 we also present the estimation results when b is set equal to a lower value of
1.7 (column 2) and a higher value of 1.9 (column 3). We ﬁrst note that the parameter
estimates with b=1.7 are very close to those when b=1.8. This is true for all values of
b lower than 1.7, because for these speciﬁcations the oﬀer rejection rate is essentially
zero. Once the value of b is low enough such that workers accept virtually all oﬀers,
then the estimates of the other parameters are fairly stable across diﬀerent values of
b. For example, the search parameters are stable because the rejection rate of oﬀers
does not vary. Hence, the estimation method ﬁnds the same λi , γ and p to match the
observed transitions under each speciﬁcation. In turn with similar search parameters,
the estimates for the rental rate distribution are also similar. The only diﬀerence is
lower minimum, as well as average, earnings at the end of the life cycle.
For our preferred b of 1.8, the oﬀer rejection rate is 0 at the beginning of the life
cycle but by the end it is closer to 7% as workers increase their reservation rental rate
29

In addition to human capital accumulation, bargaining may also be an important source of
within-job earnings growth (Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Yamaguchi (2010)).
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Table 3: Auxiliary Moments: Data and Model
Moments
Data
Model
Equation Y
X
9
u−j
cons.
0.2642 0.1569
x
-0.0012 0.0009
udur
-0.0125 -0.0072
2
udur
0.0001 0.0001
10
j−j
cons.
0.2780 0.5077
x
0.0012 0.0027
T
-0.0086 -0.0059
T2
0.0001 0.0001
w
-0.0001 -0.0009
w2
0.0000 0.0000
13
initial j − j cons.
0.1333 0.1783
jdur
-0.0088 -0.0109
jdur2
0.0001 0.0001
j−u
mean
0.0317 0.0301
12
lw
cons.
5.8391 5.8018
x
0.0127 0.0051
2
x
-0.0001 0.0000
T
0.0089 0.0137
T2
-0.0001 -0.0001
djj
0.1091 0.3463
initial w
mean(lw) 5.8677 5.8562
s.d.(lw)
0.3960 0.4642
11
∆lw
cons.
0.0240 0.0024
x
-0.0004 0.0000
x2
0.0000 0.0000
T
-0.0007 0.0000
T2
0.0000 0.0000
14
j−j
ex
-0.0011 -0.0006
2
ex
0.0000 0.0000
15
lw
ex
0.0092 0.0064
2
ex
0.0000 0.0000
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Figure 1: Model Fit

0

5

10
year

15

NLSY

20

0

10

20
year

Model

SIPP

40

Model

(b) Weekly Earnings (2)

0

.02

.02

.04

fraction
.06

fraction
.04
.06

.08

.08

.1

.1

(a) Weekly Earnings (1)

30

5

10
year

15

NLSY

20

0

10

20
year

Model

SIPP

.2
fraction
.15
.1

25
0

30
Model

(d) Job-to-Job Transitions (2)

.25

(c) Job-to-Job Transitions (1)

.05

0

5

10
year
NLSY

15
Model

(e) Unemployment-to-Job Transitions

20

40

to the value of b. While it is a common feature of equilibrium search models to have a
rejection rate of 0, evidence from the literature suggests that a signiﬁcant fraction of
oﬀers are rejected. For example, Blau and Robins (1990)’s ﬁnding that rejection rates
were as high as 30% in 1980 has recently been echoed by Krueger and Mueller (2011)
who ﬁnd rejection rates in that range for 2009-2010.30 In order to generate a higher
oﬀer rejection rate in our model one needs to increase b. Increasing b above 1.8 to 1.9
increases the oﬀer rejection rate to 24% (32%) at the beginning (end) of the life cycle.
However, this increase also substantially changes the parameter estimates as can be
seen in column 3 of Table 2. Importantly λ1 and λ2 increase and γ decreases making
search eﬀort more eﬃcient and less costly for both groups in order to match the
transition data. In addition, with a higher oﬀer rejection rate the mean of the rental
rate distribution falls while the variance increases in order to match the earnings
distribution. The largest eﬀect though is on the human capital production function
parameters. The increased search eﬃciency results in very high job-to-job transition
rates and more earnings growth over the life cycle through search. This substantially
lowers the need for human capital with a subsequent large drop in the estimate of a.
In fact simulations of this model yield very little human capital investment over the
life cycle and no on-the-job earnings growth causing a further misﬁt of that auxiliary
component. The result is that there is almost no role for human capital in earnings
growth over the life cycle. While we ﬁnd this feature of the model interesting, we
also ﬁnd these results to be extreme and therefore choose b=1.8 as our preferred
speciﬁcation.

6

Model Simulation

To examine how individual decisions change over time Figure 2 plots human capital
investment and search intensities over the life cycle for the two types of workers. Type
2 workers, the more eﬃcient group, search more intensively on average throughout the
life cycle than type 1 workers. This results in higher job oﬀer arrival rates as shown
in parts (c) and (d) of Figure 2, because the marginal returns to search are higher for
type 2 workers while the search costs are the same for the two types of workers. Type
2 workers also accumulate more human capital over the life cycle than type 1 workers
as shown in part (b) of Figure 2. There are two reasons for this. First, type 2 workers
are searching more intensively and thus spending less time in unemployment. Second,
type 2 workers also invest more in human capital, as shown in part (a), because they
expect to switch jobs more often resulting in rental rates that increase more quickly.
30

Only 60% of all oﬀers are accepted in Krueger and Mueller (2011). However, their measure of
the reservation wage is not as stark as in our model, since a signiﬁcant fraction of workers reject
oﬀers higher than their stated reservation wage and an even greater fraction accept wages that are
below their stated reservation wage. In addition, workers may have received more than one oﬀer
over the survey period; something that is ruled out in our model.
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This is an example of the interactions that are present when both human capital and
search are endogenous. In addition, type 2 workers set their reservation rates, on
average, much lower than type 1 workers, as shown in part (e) of Figure 2, because
employment is more valuable due to both a higher job oﬀer arrival rate and more
human capital investment on the job. Overall, a higher earnings proﬁle and higher
earnings growth over the life cycle occur for type 2 workers, as shown in part (c)
of Figure 3. Finally, parts (a) and (b) of Figure 3 show how the inclusion of search
heterogeneity improves the overall ﬁt of the model. As we can see from part (a), much
of the decline in the job-to-job transition rate comes from the more eﬃcient type 2
workers. Once they move up the rental rate distribution, the likelihood of making a
job-to-job transition falls. As for the unemployment-to-job transitions, part (b), the
proﬁles are essentially ﬂat at the individual level due to very little variation in search
intensity (part (d) of Figure 2) or in reservation rental rates at a level that binds
given the rental rate distribution (part (e)). However, the presence of heterogeneity
does generate an initial decline overall.
To examine the interactions between human capital accumulation and job search,
we conduct two counterfactual experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment, we turn oﬀ onthe-job search while keeping human capital accumulation. Workers start oﬀ with the
mean rental rate of human capital and keep the rental rate until the end. While there
is no on-the-job search, we do include job destruction and periods of unemployment
with a ﬁxed exit rate in order to keep the total time in employment similar across
the diﬀerent experiments. Speciﬁcally, type 1 workers start with a mean rental rate
of 4.08 and a ﬁxed unemployment exit rate of 0.05 per quarter and type 2 with 4..15
and 0.25, respectively.31
Compared to the model that has both human capital accumulation and job search,
this experiment yields a lower average investment in human capital throughout almost
the full life cycle, as shown in part (a) of Figure 4.32 The human capital investment at
the beginning of the life cycle is 56% more in the model with job search than the model
with only human capital accumulation. Only at the end of the life cycle is human
capital investment smaller in the case with both human capital and search than with
only human capital accumulation. This is because, with both human capital and job
search at the end of the life cycle, workers are less likely move up the job ladder yet
still face job destruction, similar to the scenario with human capital only. However,
the mean rental rate is much higher in the scenario with both human capital and
search than that with human capital only. Hence it is more risky to invest in human
capital in the former case given the possibility of ending up in unemployment in the
next period (a smaller b/R ratio), than the latter case.
In the second counterfactual experiment, we turn oﬀ human capital accumulation
and only allow for job search where workers start with the initial human capital but
31
32

These numbers are from type-speciﬁc averages in the search-only scenario.
Here we compare the total investment in human capital, i.e. h × i.
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cannot invest and accumulate more. In this case, the more signiﬁcant interaction
between human capital accumulation and job search is that unemployed workers
reduce their reservation rates to take advantage of human capital accumulation on
the job (part (d) in Figure 4). At the beginning of the life cycle, the reservation rate
is more than 2 times larger in the search-only case than the case with both human
capital and search. However, the search intensity under the two cases, both on the
job and when unemployed, are not very diﬀerent, as shown in parts (b) and (c) of
Figure 4. As a result, on average the rental rate in the case with both human capital
accumulation and search is lower than its counterpart in search-only case (part (e) in
Figure 4).
The life cycle earnings proﬁles for the 3 scenarios are shown in part (f) of Figure
4: the model with both human capital accumulation and job search, the model with
human capital accumulation only, and the model with search only. As we can see, the
search-only model generates more earnings growth than the model with only human
capital accumulation. Quantitatively, the search-only model can explain about 46%
of the total earnings growth, while the model with human capital only can explain
around 31% of the total earnings growth. The remaining 23% goes to the interactions
between human capital accumulation and job search.
Interestingly, the decomposition of earnings growth between job search and human
capital varies substantially over the life cycle, as is evident from part (f) of Figure
4. Job search accounts for 75% of the earnings growth over the ﬁrst 10 years of the
life cycle. Over the next 10 years, it only explains around 35%. After 20 years in the
labor market, job search generates almost none of the earnings growth. In contrast,
the role of human capital becomes larger and larger over the life cycle. Human capital
accounts for 12% of the earnings growth for the ﬁrst 10 years. The share of earnings
growth due to human capital then increases to around 56% for the next 10 years. Over
the last 20 years of the life cycle, human capital explains almost all of the growth in
earnings. These patterns come out of the model because workers shop for jobs and try
to ﬁnd the best matches early in the life cycle. As workers move up the job ladder,
on-the-job search becomes less valuable and search eﬀort declines. Human capital
investment also falls as workers age, but the results show that enough human capital
investment is maintained such that human capital accumulation dominates earnings
growth later in the life cycle. These results are consistent with Yamaguchi (2010)
who ﬁnds search is more important than human capital over the ﬁrst 5 years only to
be overtaken by human capital later in the life cycle, but are counter to Bagger et al.
(2011) who ﬁnd human capital is initially more important only to be overtaken by
search.
Our ﬁnding that job search is relatively more important than human capital accumulation in accounting for life cycle earnings growth seemingly diverges from the
majority of the existing literature that ﬁnds the exact opposite. This discrepancy can
be attributed to two reasons. First, the implications for earnings growth are sensi31

tive to model speciﬁcation. The majority of studies in the existing literature, which
ﬁnd that human capital accumulation is a more important source of earnings growth,
assumes an exogenous search technology with no heterogeneity resulting in constant
job oﬀer arrival rates, reservation wages, and job destruction rates. Importantly it
is the heterogeneity that matters. In our model without search heterogeneity human
capital accumulation is predicted to be more important than job search in accounting
for life cycle earnings growth, accounting for 70% or so. This is consistent with Pavan
(2008) who ﬁnds that a more ﬂexible search model with heterogeneity and varying
job oﬀer arrival rates and reservation wages ﬁts the data better than a search model
with less ﬂexibility in search technology and hence yields diﬀerent implications of
interest. Second, the majority of the existing literature does not consider the interactions between human capital accumulation and job search. As a result, the reported
contributions of human capital accumulation are likely contaminated because some
of the human capital accumulated over the life cycle results from the interactions
between job search and human capital accumulation. Our ﬁnding that more than
twenty percent of the earnings growth over the life cycle stems from this interaction
indicates that this interaction is an important component.

7

Conclusions

This paper presents and estimates a life cycle model that endogenizes both human
capital investment and search intensity to examine the interactions between them and
quantify the relative contribution of each mechanism to earnings growth over the life
cycle. Two notable interactions are (1) the expectation of rising rental rates due to job
search over the life cycle induces more investment in human capital almost throughout
the entire life cycle, and (2) because of human capital accumulation, workers reduce
their reservation rates and increase their search intensity to take advantage of human
capital accumulation on the job.
Importantly we estimate a model with unobserved search heterogeneity, because
it ﬁts the data much better than a model without unobserved search heterogeneity.
Workers with high search eﬃciency tend to invest more in human capital and search
more intensively and thus have a higher earnings proﬁle over the life cycle. Interestingly, the point estimate of the curvature parameter for the human capital production
function from the model with search heterogeneity is much smaller compared to those
found in the human capital literature. This is because job search generates much of
the needed curvature to match the life cycle earnings proﬁle. Based on the counterfactual experiments, a heterogeneous search model without human capital accumulation
can generate around 46% of the total earnings growth while a model with only human
capital can generate 31% of the total earnings growth. The remaining 23% indicates
that the interaction component is substantial.
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This paper adds to the existing literature on the decomposition of earnings growth
between job search and human capital in two respects. First, unlike most of the
existing literature, the model with search heterogeneity predicts a relatively larger role
for job search than human capital. The existing studies only allow for heterogeneity
in human capital but not in search and hence tend to overestimate the contribution
of human capital accumulation. This may be because workers who are capable of
learning are also more eﬃcient in searching. Hence, the presumable higher earnings
growth for workers with high learning ability comes not only from more investment
in human capital but also from more job-to-job transitions. Therefore, in frameworks
where there is only heterogeneity in human capital but not in search, human capital
accumulation plays a larger role than it would otherwise. Second, the interactions or
the spill-over eﬀects between human capital accumulation and job search should be
considered when decomposing earnings growth or disentangling one from the other.
For example, with the interactions, the role played by job search consists of not only
the conventional earnings gains through job switching, but also a ”value-added” one,
that is, a spill-over eﬀect on human capital investment.

33

References
Abowd, J. and M. Stinson (2011). Estimating measurement error in sipp annual job
earnings: A comparison of census bureau survey and ssa administrative data. US
Census Bureau, CES Working Paper 11-20.
Bagger, J., F. Fontaine, F. Postel-Vinay, and J.-M. Robin (2011). Tenure, experience,
human capital and wages: A tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics.
Mimeo.
Barlevy, G. (2008). Identiﬁcation of search models using record statistics. Review of
Economic Studies 75 (1), 29–64.
Belley, P. (2011). Understanding wage growth: Estimating and testing learning-bydoing. Kansas State University, Mimeo.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The production of human capital and the life cycle earnings.
Journal of Political Economy 75 (4), 352–365.
Blau, D. and P. Robins (1990). Job search outcomes for the employed and unemployed. Journal of Political Economy 98 (3), 637–655.
Bowlus, A. J., N. M. Kiefer, and G. R. Neumann (2001). Equilibrium search models
and the transition from school to work. International Economics Review 42 (2),
317–343.
Bowlus, A. J. and G. R. Neumann (2006). The job ladder. In H. Bunzel, B. Christensen, G. Neumann, and J.-M. Robin (Eds.), Structural Models of Wage and
Employment Dynamics, pp. 217–235. Elsevier B.V.
Browning, M., L. Hansen, and J. Heckman (1999). Micro data and general equilibrium
models. In J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics.
Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V.
Bunzel, H., B. Christensen, P. Jensen, N. Kiefer, L. Korsholm, L. Muus, G. Neumann, and M. Rosholm (1999). Investment in human capital versus diﬀerences
in company productivity levels: Speciﬁcation and estimation of equilibrium search
models for denmark. Management Working Papers 1999-15, School of Economics
and Management, University of Aarhus.
Burdett, K., C. Carrillo-Tudela, and M. Coles (2011). Human capital accumulation
and labor market equilibrium. International Economic Review 52 (3), 657–677.
Carrillo-Tudela, C. (2010). Job search, human capital and wage inequality. University
of Leicester, Mimeo.

34

Christensen, B., R. Lentz, D. Mortensen, G. Neumann, and A. Werwatz (2005).
On-the-job search and the wage distribution. Journal of Labor Economics 23 (1),
31–57.
Dustmann, C. and C. Meghir (2005). Wages, experience, and seniority. Review of
Economic Studies 72, 77–108.
Eckstein, Z. and K. Wolpin (1995). Duration to ﬁrst job and the return to schooling:
Estimates from a search-matching model. Review of Economic Studies 62 (2), 263–
286.
Goﬀe, W., G. Ferrier, and J. Rogers (1994). Global optimization of statistical functions with simulated annealing. Journal of Econometrics 18, 115–168.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and E. Renault (1993). Indirect inference. Journal of
Applied Econometrics 8, S85–S118.
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and C. Taber (1998). Explaining rising wage inequality:
Explorations with a dynamic general equilibrium model of labor earnings with
heterogeneous agents. Review of Economics Dynamics 1 (58).
Krueger, A. and A. Mueller (2011). Job search and job ﬁnding in a period of mass
unemployment: Evidence from high-frequency longitudinal data. IZA Discussion
Paper No. 5450.
Lise, J. (2011). On-the-job search and precautionary savings: Theory and empirics
of earnings and wealth inequality. University College London, Mimeo.
Liu, H. (2009). Human Capital Formation, Job Search, and Wage Dynamics. Ph. D.
thesis, University of Western Ontario.
Michelacci, C. and J. Pijoan-Mas (2011). Intertemporal labor supply with search
frictions. Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming.
Mortensen, D. (2003). Wage Dispersion: Why Are Similar Workers Paid Diﬀerently?
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Omer, V. (2004). Wage growth, search and experience: Theory and evidence. University of Minnesota, Mimeo.
Pavan, R. (2008). A ﬂexible model of individual wage dynamics and job mobility
outcomes. University of Rochester, Mimeo.
Pavan, R. (2011). Career choice and wage growth. Journal of Labor Economics 29 (3).
Postel-Vinay, F. and J.-M. Robin (2002). Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker
and employer heterogeneity. Econometrica 70 (6), 2295–2350.
35

Prat, J. (2010). The rate of learning-by-doing: Estimates from a search-matching
model. Journal of Applied Econometrics 25 (6), 929–962.
Rendon, S. (2006). Job search and asset accumulation under borrowing constraints.
International Economic Review 47 (1), 233–263.
Rubinstein, Y. and Y. Weiss (2006). Post schooling wage growth: Investment, search
and learning. In E. Hanushek and F. Welch (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of
Education, Volume 1, pp. 1–67. Elsevier.
Sanders, C. (2011). Skill uncertainty, skill accumulation and occupational choice.
Washington University at St. Louis, Mimeo.
Schönberg, U. (2007). Wage growth due to human capital accumulation and job
search: A comparision between the united states and germany. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 60, 562–586.
Sim, S.-G. (2009). Equilibrium wage-tenure contract with unobserved human capital.
University of Wisconsin - Madison, Mimeo.
Topel, R. and M. Ward (1992). Job mobility and careers of young men. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 107 (2), 439–479.
Wolpin, K. (1992). The determinants of black-white diﬀerences in early employment
careers: Search, layoﬀs, quits, and endogenous wage growth. Journal of Political
Economy 100, 535–560.
Yamaguchi, S. (2010). Job search, bargaining, and wage dynamics. Journal of Labor
Economics 23 (3), 595–631.

36

A

Monte Carlo Exercise

For the Monte Carlo exercise we use the model without unobserved heterogeneity, we
suppress endogenous quits to unemployment, and we set δ equal to the true value.
This eases the computational burden while still giving informative results. The true
model is speciﬁed in the second column of Table 4. We simulate 40 random samples
of size 500 based on the true model, assuming a 40-year life cycle. For each random
sample, the moments or the coeﬃcients from the auxiliary regressions and weighting
matrix are estimated. Indirect inference is then applied to each random sample to
estimate the model parameters. The means and standard deviations of the parameter
estimates are presented in the third to ﬁfth column of Table 4.
The ﬁrst exercise assumes that all the information used to calculate the moments
is available over the full life cycle. The estimates, as shown in column 3, are very
close to the true values indicating that the proposed auxiliary model can recover the
true parameters.
The second exercise assumes the information is only available for the ﬁrst half of
the life cycle. This is motivated by the nature of NLSY, since it does not cover the full
working life of the sample participants. The majority of individuals in our ﬁnal sample
only have 20 years of labor market history. Theoretically, the parameter estimates
should still converge to the true values with only the partial histories, since all of the
structural parameters are constant over time and age. However, the estimates from
partial histories may be less precise, because the auxiliary models from the ﬁrst 20
years may contain only weak identiﬁcation information. In particular, this may result
from the loss of information on post-displacement earnings and unemployment-to-job
transitions for older workers, which are helpful for identifying the search parameters
and b, because investment in human capital becomes less and less valuable as workers
age. The results are shown in column 4 of Table 4. The estimates are substantially
nosier than those using full histories, but the true values are contained within standard
conﬁdence intervals around the estimates.
The third exercise is to test if the estimates can be improved if additional information over the full life cycle is used to augment the ﬁrst half of the life cycle. In
particular, we augment the moments used in the second exercise with information on
job-to-job transitions and the earnings proﬁle over the full life cycle (see equations
(14) and (15)). The resulting estimates, presented in the last column of Table 4, are
much improved as compared to those in the second exercise with smaller standard
deviations.
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λ
b
γ
a
α
h0
µ
σ

B

Table 4: Monte Carlo Results
True values 40 Years 20 Years
0.57
0.592
0.594
(0.055)
(0.057)
1.50
1.502
1.415
(0.025)
(0.073)
4.00
4.179
4.567
(0.505)
(1.159)
0.08
0.080
0.092
(0.001)
(0.009)
0.60
0.596
0.471
(0.012)
(0.093)
6.00
ﬁxed
ﬁxed
0.70
0.684
0.628
(0.034)
(0.049)
0.30
0.309
0.351
(0.018)
(0.034)

20+40
0.601
(0.062)
1.463
(0.071)
4.368
(0.791)
0.085
(0.006)
0.539
(0.067)
ﬁxed
0.651
(0.049)
0.331
(0.032)

Data Issues

One key issue when implementing indirect inference is sampling from the modelsimulated data in exactly the same way as the actual data are sampled. Due to
the nature of the NLSY data, there are two several problems that deserve special
attention.
The ﬁrst is an initial condition problem. In the NLSY sample, around 33% of
white male high school graduates start full-time jobs immediately after high school
graduation. Recall that we set the calendar quarter that contains the high school
graduation date as the ﬁrst quarter in the labor market. By doing so, we produce
the appearance of duration dependence in the unemployment-to-job transition even
when none is present. This generates a spike in the unemployment-to-job transition
rate at the ﬁrst quarter, of 56%, which then drops to 21% in the following quarter. To
address this, those jobs that start immediately after high school graduation are leftcensored and the information on unemployment-to-job transitions at the ﬁrst quarter
is not used in the auxiliary regressions for both the real data and the simulated data
from the model.
Second, in the NLSY during each interview respondents are asked a wage for each
job held since the last interview. If a job is ongoing at the interview week, the reported
wage is treated as the wage as of the interview week for that job. If a job ends before
the interview week, the reported wage is treated as the wage of the last week and,
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hence, the last quarter for that job. Meanwhile, respondents are interviewed once a
year before 1994 and once every two years after 1994. Hence wages are not available
for every quarter, only for those quarters that contain the interview weeks and the
last weeks of jobs. To address this sampling issue, we estimate a transition matrix of
interview quarters in the NLSY sample and apply it to the model-simulated data so
that we can generate an identical interview sampling scheme in the model as in the
NLSY and ensure a similar selection of observations for both the model and data.
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